Mike Keefe/Denver Post

Future historians may record a narrow window in the early years of electronic voting when people actually believed that a company that made both ATM and voting machines was unable to deliver a voting machine that spat out a receipt. As I sit on the back porch blogging with a wireless laptop, it is not magical thinking to imagine all sorts of ways computers counting numbers could be programmed to change them, even while they were guarded and apparently secure.

California's secretary of state began closing that window last night. Debra Bowen ruled for science, not faith, in requiring security fixes or else -- "else" is paper ballots -- in her state's next election. Other states are likely to take note.

The Brad Blog: Paper Ballots For California! - Secretary Of State Announces De-Certification/Re-Certification Plans For E-Voting Systems

In a dramatic late-night press conference, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified, and then recertified with conditions, all but one voting system used in the state. Her decisions, following her unprecedented, independent "Top-to-Bottom Review" of all certified electronic voting systems, came just under the wire to meet state requirements for changes in voting system certification.

Bowen announced that she will be disallowing the use of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE, usually touch-screen) voting systems on Election Day, but for one DRE machine per polling place which may be used for disabled voters. The paper trails from votes cast on DREs manufactured by voting machine companies Diebold and Sequoia must be 100% manually counted after Election Day....

State curtails e-voting. Sacramento Bee:

More than three dozen California counties have invested millions of dollars in the technology and some will be forced to replace many machines by February under Bowen's order.

"I reject the notion that I should not require changes in security simply because counties already own (the machines)," Bowen said.

AP: Calif. Tightens Voting Machine Standards

Bowen said she had decertified the machines for use and then recertified them on the condition they meet her new security standards. When asked what would happen if the companies failed to do so, Bowen responded, "I think they will."

And an odd response from manufacturers:

Company officials have downplayed the results of Bowen's review, saying they reflected unrealistic, worst-case scenarios that would be counteracted by security measures taken by the companies and local election officials.

The companies also complained that the examiners had access to computer coding, manuals and other information that is not available to the public.

"The public" is not the probable culprit. If elections have been rigged, the outcomes have been determined by insiders with keys to the machine codes, and the manuals.

Continuing,

Officials with Sequoia said they were disappointed with Bowen's withdrawal of the company's certification but would make necessary improvements. They defended their equipment as accurate and secure.

"Electronic voting systems have never been successfully tampered with in an actual election," the company said in a statement. "That same statement cannot be made about lever machines and paper-based voting systems throughout our nation's history."

How would they know there has never been electronic tampering? Why should you believe them?

CA Releases Source Code Review of Voting Machines -- New Security Flaws Revealed; Old Ones Were Never Fixed. Wired.

...(the) code team found that the Diebold system still had many of the most serious security flaws that computer scientists had uncovered in the system years ago, despite Diebold's claims that problems had been fixed.

These include vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker to install malicious software to record votes incorrectly or miscount them or that would allow an attacker with access to only one machine and its memory card to launch a vote-stealing virus that could spread to every machine in a county. They also found that the Diebold system lacked administrative safeguards to prevent county election workers from escalating their privileges on the election management software that counts the votes. Essentially, the researchers found that the Diebold software was so "fragile" that it would require an entire re-engineering of the system to make it secure.

This one includes technical details of the vulnerabilities, such as,

Votes can be swapped or neutralized by modifying the defined candidate voting coordinates stored on the memory card

Multiple vulnerabilities in the AccuBasic interpreter allow arbitrary code execution

A malicious AccuBasic script can be used to hide attacks against the optical-scan machine and defeat the integrity of zero and summary tapes printed on the optical-scan machine

As a consequence of the report, Senate to Hold Hearing on Security of Voting Machines.

This all happened on deadline for the secretary of state, but too late for the L.A. Times deadldine. They went to press with the colorful details of "still waiting" for a press conference that didn't begin until 11:45 p.m. (State's decision on electronic voting machines is delayed):

... county officials were glued to their phones and a growing crowd of reporters, interest groups and state officials gathered outside her office.

Some decamped to a Mexican restaurant across the street, where they sipped margaritas while awaiting word.

Rumors swirled that Los Angeles County's InkaVote balloting system would decertified; Bowen's office would not confirm or deny it. When pizza arrived at her office around 8 p.m., the crowd's hopes for an imminent announcement faded.

I can't find a blog update or "online only" update, but perhaps they'll come back with the story behind the scenes of a decision originally intended to be announced at noon.